Deutsche Bundesbank versus the Eurosystem constitute a risk for German taxpayers in case of the default of southern European banking systems and governments. They advocate a regulatory limit on TARGET2 liabilities. Buiter et al. 3 responded that the divergence of TARGET2 balances refl ects capital fl ight from crisis countries rather than the financing of current account balances. Bindseil and König 4 argue that imposing a limit on intra-Eurosystem credit would be inconsistent with the existence and survival of the currency union.
We add to this discussion by putting the divergence of TARGET2 imbalances into a broader historical context. We show how an unsustainable current account divergence in the euro area was triggered by diverging fi scal policy stances, enhanced by monetary expansion after the burst of the dotcom bubble and translated via real estate and government consumption booms into diverging international asset positions. We explain the divergence of national TAR-GET2 balances within the Eurosystem since the crisis as the replacement of private capital fl ows to the crisis countries with a public quasi-unlimited credit mechanism which prevents or cushions the adjustment of diverging competitiveness and current account balances. Finally, we show that capital and deposit fl ight from the crisis countries has brought the Deutsche Bundesbank into a debtor position to the banking system. We explore different options to absorb surplus liquidity from the German banking system to forestall infl ationary pressure in German goods markets and/or bubbles in the German real estate market.
The ongoing eurozone crisis is not only understood as a European sovereign debt crisis, but also as fundamental threat to the common European currency. Europe is subdivided into debtor and creditor countries which struggle with one another over the size and conditions of rescue packages to safeguard European fi nancial stability. Whereas rescue packages negotiated by the EU and the IMF and the newly installed European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have become more and more politically tenuous and conditional, the TARGET2 balances of the Eurosystem have assumed the role of a quasi-unlimited fi nancing mechanism for southern European current and fi nancial account defi cits.
Sinn and Wollmershäuser 1 and Sinn 2 opened the discussion of whether rising TARGET2 imbalances have assumed the role of perpetuating intra-European current account imbalances. They argue that rising TARGET2 claims of the * The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and should not be reported otherwise. We thank Daniel Gros for very helpful comments.
1 H.W. S i n n , T. Wo l l m e r s h ä u s e r : Target Diverging fi scal policy paths, housing booms and diverging unit labour costs were driving forces of rising intra-European current account imbalances, which were underpinned by low interest rates. Since the outbreak of the crisis, the adjustment of intra-EMU current account imbalances has been postponed by a rising divergence of TARGET2 balances, as the repatriation of private international credit and deposit fl ight from the crisis economies is intermediated by central bank credit. Given that this process has brought the Deutsche Bundesbank into a debtor position to the domestic fi nancial system, the article discusses options for liquidity absorption by the Bundesbank to forestall asset price bubbles in Germany.
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Holger Zemanek, Leipzig University, Germany. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-013-0444-0 activity in Germany, combined with historically low ECB interest rates after the burst of the dotcom bubble, encouraged German fi nancial institutions to hunt for higher yields in European periphery countries by participating in unfolding real estate, fi nancial market or consumption booms. Accelerating growth and rising incomes suggested higher future tax revenues in the eventual crisis countries, which made euro periphery government bonds seem a risk-free and valuable investment. As a result, government bond yields in southern Europe declined to historical lows.
In a monetary union with diverging growth rates, national fi scal policies have to be anti-cyclical to counteract the procyclical effects of monetary policy. 6 However, in several western and southern euro area countries, fi scal policies became pro-cyclical as spending increased, in particular relative to Germany, where faltering spending slowed down economic activity. In the upper panel of Figure 1 , the relative divergence of the fi scal policy stances of Germany and the 
The public-driven emergence of fi nancial and current account imbalances
The roots of diverging fi nancial account balances in the euro area can be traced back to the year 1990, when the German unifi cation constituted an asymmetric shock to Europe. Before unifi cation, Germany generated current account surpluses and substantial net capital exports. With the unifi cation shock, German net capital exports were redirected towards domestic investment and consumption, given the heavy investment needs in the new eastern part of unifi ed Germany. While a boom developed in Germany, the rest of Europe slid into recession as German capital exports dried up. When by the mid-1990s the unifi cation boom had ended, German wages had substantially increased relative to productivity. The German mark had substantially appreciated in real terms against the currencies of its European trading partners. General government debt had spiked to unprecedented levels, and a historical peak in unemployment had been reached.
The role of fi scal policies
During the second half of the 1990s, consolidation efforts by the German government and the enterprise sectors started to set the stage for diverging current account positions in Europe. German austerity constituted a new asymmetric shock to Europe, which continued until the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2008. 5 The German public sector struggled with fi scal consolidation in line with the Maastricht Treaty. Public wage austerity and reforms in the social security sector (to curtail non-wage labour costs and to reduce unemployment) were regarded as pivotal towards public consolidation. Simultaneously, German industry aimed to regain international competitiveness by cutting real wages and increasing productivity. The private and public attempts to moderate real wage increases were facilitated by the exceptionally high unemployment rate and wage competition from Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia. Refl ecting the mood of austerity, German domestic investment and consumption slowed down, while saving for a more uncertain future increased.
In the second half of the 1990s, the convergence process towards the European monetary union had led to the sharp decline of nominal and real interest rates in the former high infl ation countries in the south of the European Union. With the introduction of the euro in 1999, real interest rates in the European periphery countries in particular further declined, which further stimulated economic activity. Weak economic 5 G. S c h n a b l , H. Z e m a n e k : Inter-temporal Savings, Current Account Trends and Asymmetric Shocks in a Heterogeneous European Monetary Union, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2011, pp. 153-160 . 
